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Abstract Observing eye contact between others enhances
the tendency to subsequently follow their gaze and has
been suggested to function as a social signal that adds
meaning to an upcoming action or event. The present study
investigated effects of observed eye contact in high-func-
tioning autism (HFA). Two faces on a screen either looked
at or away from each other before providing congruent or
incongruent gaze cues to one of two target locations. In
contrast to control participants, HFA participants did not
depict enhanced gaze following after observing eye con-
tact. Individuals with autism, hence, do not seem to process
observed mutual gaze as a social signal indicating the
relevance of upcoming (gaze) behaviour. This may be
based on the reduced tendency of individuals with HFA to
engage in social gaze behavior themselves, and might
underlie some of the characteristic deficiencies in social
communicative behaviour in autism.
Keywords Gaze following  Joint attention  Social
cognition  High-functioning autism
Introduction
Communication and social interaction involve various
instances in which we engage in eye contact, i.e. mutual gaze,
with others or in which we jointly attend to the environment
by coordinating our gaze (Baldwin 1995). People actively
seek eye contact, direct others’ attention to the environment,
and detect objects or events by rapidly shifting attention
according to others’ gaze (Bakeman and Adamson 1984;
Driver et al. 1999; Mundy et al. 2007; Farroni et al. 2002;
Friesen and Kingstone 1998). Recent evidence suggests that
initiating joint attention by directing someone else’s gaze is
associated with increased activity in reward-related neuro-
circuitry (Schilbach et al. 2010). Attending to and with others,
in turn, plays an important role in the coordination of joint
actions (Clark and Krych 2004; Richardson and Dale 2005;
Sebanz et al. 2006), in social learning (Csibra and Gergely
2009; Striano et al. 2006), in communication (Tomasello
et al. 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007), and in the reg-
ulation of social relations (Ham and Tronick 2006).
More generally, joint attention constitutes a simple form
of a social encounter and, as such, contributes to our
understanding of other persons’ inner experiences (including
perceptions, thoughts, intentions to act) and their behaviour
(Schilbach 2010; Schilbach et al. 2012, 2013). Attending
with others has been argued to underlie the development of
A. Bo¨ckler  N. Sebanz
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Present Address:
A. Bo¨ckler (&)
Department of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for
Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstraße 1,
04103 Leipzig, Germany
e-mail: aboeckler@cbs.mpg.de
B. Timmermans  K. Vogeley  L. Schilbach
University Hospital Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Present Address:
B. Timmermans
School of Psychology, King’s College, Aberdeen, UK
N. Sebanz
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University,
Budapest, Hungary
K. Vogeley
Institute for Neuroscience and Medicine—Cognitive
Neuroscience (INM3), Research Center Juelich, Juelich,
Germany
123
J Autism Dev Disord (2014) 44:1651–1658
DOI 10.1007/s10803-014-2038-5
social skills by establishing an understanding of self and
other as distinct agents who can have (different) mental
states such as desires, beliefs, or goals (Baron-Cohen 1991;
Barresi and Moore 1996; Reddy 2003).
Autism is a developmental disorder that is characterized by
impairments of communication and social interaction and,
specifically, a lack of the ability to intuitively infer other
people’s mental states (10th revision of the International
Classification of Diseases, ICD-10, World Health Organiza-
tion; Baron-Cohen 1995; Hill and Frith 2003). Individuals
with autism also show a reduced motivation to share attention
with others from their first years of life onward (Chevallier
et al. 2012). While reflexive gaze following (see Frischen et al.
for a review) seems relatively preserved in autism (Chawarska
et al. 2003; Kyllia¨inen and Hietanen 2004; see Nation and
Penny 2008 for a review), the neural mechanisms underlying
this effect differ between individuals with and without autism
(Greene et al. 2011). Also, individuals with autism initiate joint
attention to a lesser extent (Mundy et al. 1994; Mundy 2003;
Sigman and Ruskin 1999), are less sensitive to social gaze
(Schilbach et al. 2011), and tend to avoid eye contact, which
has been shown to increase arousal (increased skin conduc-
tance response) (Kyllia¨inen and Hietanen 2006). Besides
being less prone (or even averse) to the direct experience of eye
contact and gaze-based communication, individuals with
autism show a reduced tendency to direct attention to the eyes
of observed others (e.g. in video clips), particularly in dynamic
social interactions (Speer et al. 2007).
A question that has not been addressed until now is how
observed attentional relations between others are processed
in autism and how this influences subsequent behavior. How
is eye contact perceived and interpreted when it is merely
observed between two agents? The aim of the present study
was to investigate whether individuals with autism process
observed attentional relations in similar ways as non-autistic
individuals. For this purpose, we employed an established
paradigm that targets the effect of observing eye contact
between two persons on subsequent processing of gaze cues.
In this task, two faces were depicted that provided gaze cues
after they had established eye contact with each other or not
(Bo¨ckler et al. 2011). Previous findings revealed that healthy
participants showed an enhanced sensitivity to gaze cues
when the two faces had looked at each other beforehand. This
extended earlier findings of increased gaze following after
being looked at oneself (Bristow et al. 2007; Senju and
Csibra 2008) and suggests that both experienced and
observed eye contact may act as ‘ostensive cues’, enhancing
the perceived significance of subsequent (gaze) behavior
(Csibra and Gergely 2009).1
Does observing mutual gaze in others also enhance the
use of subsequent gaze cues in high-functioning individuals
with autism (HFA)? The category HFA comprises people
diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and Childhood Aut-
ism with average or above-average IQ. High-functioning
individuals may be better able to understand interactions
that are merely observed (as compared to interactions they
are involved in), since the observational stance might make
the use of learned and rule-based compensatory strategies
easier (e.g. counting words as an indicator of mood;
Schilbach et al. 2011, 2013). Also, observed eye contact
may not automatically elicit the same emotional conse-
quences (increased arousal) in individuals with autism as
being engaged in eye contact oneself and could, hence,
constitute less arousing or less aversive social information.
Previous studies have reported that individuals with autism
process low-level social information (i.e. information that
can be processed without higher-order theory of mind) in
similar ways as non-autistic people. For instance, partici-
pants with high-functioning autism (HFA) showed an
automatic understanding of others’ different spatial per-
spective (Zwickel et al. 2010) and took certain aspects of a
co-actor’s task (e.g. stimulus and response location) into
account, even though this was irrelevant for performing
their own tasks (Sebanz et al. 2005). Accordingly, observed
eye contact between others may be processed as a low-
level social signal that attracts attention and highlights
others’ subsequent behaviour.
On the other hand, several studies have shown that
individuals with autism are specifically impaired in
understanding communicative signals (Baron-Cohen 1989;
Baron-Cohen et al. 2000; Happe´ 1993) and make less use
of gaze-based cues to infer others’ intentions, predict their
behaviour (Pierno et al. 2006), or form evaluative
impressions of others (Kuzmanovic et al. 2011). The
interpretation of observed eye contact as being communi-
catively meaningful might depend on previous experiences
with such signals. Specifically, people may understand
observed attentional relations as communicative by map-
ping them onto their own experiences of being engaged in
such relations (Barresi and Moore 1996). Since individuals
with autism experience difficulties with the understanding
of communicative cues directed at them, it is possible that
they also do not process the communicative aspect of
mutual gaze when it is merely observed, or do so to a lesser
extent.
The present study applied a third-person observation
setting of shared attention in order to investigate the pro-
cessing of observed eye contact in HFA participants. If
HFA participants process observed eye contact as an
indication for the relevance of the subsequent gaze cues (as
do healthy subjects, see Bo¨ckler et al. 2011) we should find
enhanced gaze cueing effects after the observation of eye
1 Note that the term ‘observed eye contact’ refers to the observation
of eye contact between other agents (not the experience of being
looked at oneself).
1652 J Autism Dev Disord (2014) 44:1651–1658
123
contact. Conversely, if individuals with autism are not
responsive to the social cue of observing eye contact in
others we should not find an increase in gaze cueing sub-
sequent to the observation of eye contact.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-seven persons who underwent an autism screening
and were diagnosed with HFA (9 female; age range from
20 to 62 years, mean age 41 years) participated in the
experiment. Their performance was compared to 25 control
participants (10 female, age range from 21 to 63 years,
mean age 41 years) who were matched with respect to age,
gender, and years of education. All patients were diagnosed
and recruited in the Autism Outpatient Clinic at the
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cologne
(Germany). As part of a systematic assessment imple-
mented in this clinic, diagnoses were made by two inde-
pendent specialized clinicians corresponding to ICD-10
criteria and supplemented by an extensive neuropsycho-
logical assessment. Patients with the diagnosis of Asper-
ger’s syndrome (F84.5) and childhood autism (F84.0) were
included when average or above-average IQ had been
ascertained. All patients, therefore, belonged to the HFA
population. Due to the fact that both diagnostic groups
exhibit a comparable intellectual level of functioning and
that differences in diagnostic criteria relate to language
development in early childhood irrelevant for the adult
level of social adaptation, the two diagnoses were sub-
sumed under the term HFA. None of the participants
received psychotropic medication. Control participants
were tested at the Radboud University Nijmegen (the
Netherlands).
Participants completed several questionnaires, including
the AQ (‘‘Autism Quotient’’, Baron-Cohen 2003), the EQ
(‘‘Empathy Quotient’’) and the SQ (‘‘Systemizing Quo-
tient’’, Wheelwright et al. 2006), and the BDI (‘‘Beck
Depression Inventory’’, Beck and Steer 1987) (see Table 1
for demographic and questionnaire data). Three of the
autistic participants did not complete the EQ and the SQ.
As depression is a common co-morbidity in HFA (e.g.
Stewart et al. 2006) it does not come as a surprise that there
was a significant difference in the BDI score for the control
and the HFA group (see Table 1). Consistent with the
clinical diagnoses, there were also significant differences in
the AQ between the patient and the comparison group (see
Table 1) (Wheelwright et al. 2006). The testing environ-
ments of the two sites (Cologne and Nijmegen) were kept
as similar as possible. Participants were welcomed and
instructed using a predefined script; they were then seated
in front of a 17-in. TFT computer screen and performed a
training session. When they had no more questions, the
experimental session began. Light was kept at an ambient
level. Questionnaires were filled in after the experimental
session.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli were presented using ‘Presentation’ software.
Photographs of two horizontally aligned female faces were
depicted in the centre of a screen (see Fig. 1). Two factors
were manipulated in the present experiment: first, the two
faces either looked at each other (attention shared) or away
from each other (attention not shared) before providing
gaze cues. Second, gaze cues were either congruent or
incongruent with regard to the target location.
Each trial started with the presentation of the two faces
with their eyes closed. After 900 ms, the two faces either
looked at each other (attention shared; 50 % of the trials) or
looked away from each other (attention not shared; 50 % of
the trials). 900 ms later, a fixation cross appeared between
the two faces for 500 ms so as to draw participants’
attention to the centre of the screen. Subsequently, both
faces simultaneously looked at one of the two target
locations (towards the upper or towards the lower part of
the screen). Following randomized stimulus onset asyn-
chronies of 500, 600, or 700 ms, the target (an apple or a
pear) was presented at one of the locations until partici-
pants responded (max. 2,000 ms). In half of the trials (both
‘attention shared’ trials and ‘attention not shared’ trials),
the target appeared at the cued location (congruent; e.g.
faces had looked up and the target appeared on the upper
side of the screen) and in the other half of the trials, the
target appeared at the non-cued location (incongruent; e.g.
faces had looked up and the target appears on the lower
side of the screen). Inter-trial intervals were 700 ms. Par-
ticipants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to
the identity of the fruit by pressing one of two response
keys (two-choice task) with two fingers of their right hand
(e.g. press index finger for apple and middle finger for
pear). In order to exclude effects of stimulus–response
compatibility, response buttons were aligned orthogonally
to the target locations. The order of trials was randomized
within blocks (7 blocks of 48 trials each).
Data Analysis
Reaction times (RTs) were analyzed by means of a repe-
ated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). A
2 9 2 9 2 factorial design was applied with the between-
subject factor Group (HFA vs. control) and the within-
subject factors Attention (shared vs. not shared) and Gaze
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). Error rates were
J Autism Dev Disord (2014) 44:1651–1658 1653
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not normally distributed and the Mann–Whitney-U-Test
was employed for the non-parametric analysis.
Results
RTs
Results are displayed in Fig. 2. Only trials with correct
responses were included in the analysis (error rate see
below). The HFA group responded generally slower than
the control group which was reflected in a significant main
effect of Group [F(1, 50) = 4.6, p \ .05, g2 = .084]. Gaze
congruency had a significant influence on RTs [F(1,
50) = 5.0, p \ .05, g2 = .091] with faster responses for
congruent gaze cues.
The main focus of this study was the modulation of the
effect of Gaze congruency by prior observation of eye
contact between others. Crucially, there was a three-way
interaction of Attention and Gaze congruency with the
between-subject factor Group [F(1, 50) = 7.3, p \ .01,
g2 = .128]. This was due to the fact that observed eye
contact significantly enhanced the effect of Gaze congru-
ency in the control group [F(1, 24) = 4.5, p \ . 05,
g2 = .157], but not in the HFA group [F(1, 26) = 3.5,
p = .072, g2 = .119]. In the control group, the congruency
effect (faster RTs for congruent gaze cues) was larger after
faces had looked at each other. By contrast, the congruency
effect in the HFA group was not enhanced by prior shared
attention, but was even numerically decreased after the
faces had looked at each other [p = .072].
Gaze congruency interacted (trend) with the between-
subject factor Group [F(1, 50) = 3.3, p = .075,
g2 = .062]. Subsequent analyses revealed that congruent
gaze cues significantly speeded up responses in the control
group [F(1, 24) = 8.5, p \ .01, g2 = .262], but not in the
HFA group [F(1, 26) \ 1, g2 = .003].
Additional Analyses
The HFA group showed generally slower response times
than the control group (see above). In an additional
ANOVA we therefore included Speed (mean RTs) as a
covariate. Results revealed that Speed did not interact with
Attention, Gaze congruency, or the interaction of Atten-
tion 9 Gaze congruency [Fs(1, 50) \ 1].
The HFA group in the present study had higher BDI
scores than the control group. In order to investigate
whether depression (partly) accounts for the current find-
ings, BDI was included as covariate in an additional
Table 1 Demographic and questionnaire data
HFA group Control group Statistics
M SD M SD
Gender 18:9 15:10 t(50) = .81 p = .42
Age 41.4 10.35 40.7 10.50 t(50) = .31 p = .76
Education (years) 17.5 5.06 16.1 4.74 t(46) = .68 p = .51
AQ 40.04 4.80 15.96 7.06 t(50) = 13.6 p \ .001
EQ 16.50 9.29 41.71 11.33 t(47) = 8.15 p \ .001
SQ 37.17 15.31 39.42 12.40 t(47) = .31 p = .76
BDI 16.42 11.93 5.76 4.19 t(50) = 4.38 p \ .001
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of the event sequence. After looking
straight ahead, the two faces looked at each other or away from each
other, and then simultaneously shifted their gaze up or down. After
stimulus onset asynchronies of 500, 600, or 700 ms, the target (apple
or pear) appeared at a location that was either congruent or
incongruent in regard to the gaze cues. In the schematic image above
the faces look at each other and the target (apple) appears at the gaze
congruent location
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ANOVA. Results revealed that BDI did not interact with
Attention, Gaze congruency, or Attention 9 Gaze con-
gruency [F(1, 50) \ 1].2
Finally, the HFA group did not show an overall effect of
Gaze congruency. In order to further explore the effect of
Attention on Gaze congruency, we performed an analysis
including only the 16 individuals of the patient group who
showed an effect of Gaze congruency (faster RTs for gaze
congruent trials). This sub-group showed a similar pattern
as the complete HFA group and this time the interaction
was significant [F(1, 15) = 6.3, p \ .05; g2 = .295]: the
response time benefit for gaze congruent trials was larger
after the two faces had not looked at each other.
Errors
Mean error rates were 2.3 %. Error rates were not normally
distributed and the Mann–Whitney-U-Test was employed
for the non-parametric analysis of error rates. This analysis
revealed that HFA and control participants did not signif-
icantly differ concerning the effects of Attention, Gaze
congruency, or the effect of Attention on the effect of Gaze
congruency [Z(1, 50) B 1.7, p C .09].
Discussion
The present study investigated whether observing eye contact
between others modulates responses to subsequently pre-
sented gaze cues in HFA and control participants. In contrast
to healthy controls, HFA participants did not show enhanced
responsiveness to gaze cues after observing eye contact and,
hence, did not additionally benefit from congruent gaze cues
subsequent to observing shared attention between others.
It has been suggested that eye contact constitutes a
powerful social cue that is indicative of a communicative
intent towards the addressee and highlights the importance
of a subsequent action (Csibra and Gergely 2009; Schil-
bach et al. 2010, 2011). The enhanced sensitivity to gaze
cues after observing eye contact in control participants
replicates earlier findings (Bo¨ckler et al. 2011). It indicates
that observed eye contact, although lacking a direct com-
municative intent towards the observer, highlights the
significance of the observed individuals’ subsequent
actions (or gazes).3 The absence of this pattern in autistic
Fig. 2 Mean RTs (in ms) and errors rates (in %) for the HFA group (left side) and the control group (right side). Note that scales for RTs differ.
Error bars display within-subjects confidence intervals based on Loftus and Masson 1994
2 The control group entailed numerically more women than the HFA
group and there are indications of larger gaze cueing effects in women
(Bayliss et al. 2005). Though the HFA and control group did not
differ significantly in terms of age and gender, both variables were
included as covariates in additional analyses. Results revealed no
interactions of Gender with any of the other factors or with any of the
interactions [Fs(1, 50) B 1.9, p C .16, g2 B 0.038] and no effect of
Age with any of the factors or interactions [Fs(1, 50) \ 1].
3 It needs to be mentioned that the condition in which the two faces
are looking at each other, as opposed to looking away, constitutes a
situation in which (a) participants’ attention is drawn to the centre of
the screen and (b) the two faces are looking at something together
with the participant. Control experiments in the original paper suggest
that the enhanced gaze cueing effect after observing direct gaze is not
J Autism Dev Disord (2014) 44:1651–1658 1655
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participants implies that they did not process observed eye
contact between other agents in the same way, and may
have failed to perceive eye contact as an ostensive cue.
Even though individuals with autism appear to take into
account certain social information such as others’ gaze
direction, spatial perspectives, or tasks (Chawarska et al.
2003; Sebanz et al. 2005; Zwickel et al. 2010), they did not
respond to observed attentional relations in similar ways as
non-autistic individuals. This study, hence, is the first to
show that the processing of observed eye contact differs
between people with and without HFA already at a rea-
sonably early level. In HFA participants, the observation of
eye contact did not affect subsequent gaze following,
suggesting that they did not spontaneously interpret shared
attention as a social signal that indicates the meaningful-
ness of a subsequent gaze cue.
Why was gaze following in individuals with HFA not
increased after observing shared gaze? Mutual gaze consti-
tutes a simple case of a communicative interaction, and
understanding such social phenomena in observation may
require experience in comparable situations that involve
other mental agents with (communicative) intentions. Based
on their own experiences, people form general predictions
and apply them to understand observed social and commu-
nicative interactions of others (Clark 2013; Timmermans
et al. 2012; Carhart-Harris and Friston 2010). In the specific
case of observed eye contact, people may obtain an under-
standing by mapping the observed attentional relation
between other agents onto their own previous experiences of
mutual gaze with others (Barresi and Moore 1996). While
non-autistic people appear to be highly motivated to and
rewarded by engaging in joint attention (Schilbach 2010;
Tomasello and Carpenter 2007), individuals with autism use
communicative gaze to a lesser extent, possibly because of a
lack of motivation to initiate experiences of joint attention or
joint action (Chevallier et al. 2012). Hence, it is possible that
their reduced responsiveness to observed eye contact arises
from the lack of experience in communicating with eye
contact or with gaze cues themselves. Future research may
provide insight into the link between experiencing and
observing eye contact by assessing whether the experience
with communicative gaze behaviour predicts the sensitivity
to observed communications (Schilbach et al. 2013). In a
similar vein, it might prove interesting to address whether
interactive trainings for individuals with autism (which
would help establish social experiences that are comparable
to non-autistic people) affect the interpretation of observed
interactions as well.
Alternatively, the mechanism behind the enhanced gaze
following effect in controls (but not in HFAs) after
observing eye contact may be related to more general
preferences in processing local versus global properties.
Two faces looking at each other form a meaningful pattern,
or ‘Gestalt’, that (non-autistic) people are well acquainted
with. This may lead to the representation of faces looking
at each other as a global ‘joint attention’ unit by the control
participants, but not by the HFA participants. The reduced
tendency of individuals with autism to integrate informa-
tion into global representations may be at the bottom of
their reduced sensitivity to the gaze cues provided by faces
that had just looked at each other (Bo¨lte et al. 2007).
The HFA group in the present study did not show an
overall effect of gaze congruency. This is somewhat
inconsistent with the majority of the literature, reporting
gaze following in individuals with autism in standard
computerized settings (see Nation and Penny 2008 for a
review). A possible reason for the absence of this effect
may be that our experiment employed a fixation cross after
the two faces had looked at/away from each other (in order
to draw attention to the centre of the screen in both con-
ditions). This exogenous onset cue may have drawn
attention away from the eyes of the faces altogether in the
HFA group. In addition, it has been shown that individuals
with autism, while showing similar behavioural gaze cue-
ing effects as individuals without autism, process gaze cues
differently on a neuronal level (Greene et al. 2011). The
authors suggested that individuals with autism do not
assign special social significance to gaze stimuli, but may
be able to use lower-level properties of eye gaze to direct
attention accordingly, at least in controlled settings. In
more complex situations these mechanisms may not func-
tion as efficiently (Greene et al. 2011), which may also
explain the absence of an overall gaze cueing effect in the
present study. Importantly however, additional analyses
including only HFA participants who showed the typical
gaze follow effect, showed that gaze following in those
participants was also not enhanced by observed eye con-
tact. This indicates that the absence of an enhancement of
gaze following after observing eye contact in the HFA
group cannot be merely explained by the absence of an
overall gaze cueing effect.
Contrary to the healthy control group, participants with
HFA followed gaze less after observing eye contact
(marginal effect in the entire HFA group, significant effect
in the subsample showing overall gaze cueing). It is pos-
sible that HFA participants find eye contact between others
harder to process than two faces looking away from each
other, because eye contact requires understanding the
relation of the two individuals gazing at each other,
whereas faces looking away can be processed indepen-
dently. This may be based on a general impairment of
Footnote 3 continued
due to either of these potential confounds. Enhanced gaze following
was not found when participants’ attention was directed towards the
center by non-social cues or when one face looked at an object before
providing gaze cues (Bo¨ckler et al., 2011).
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parsing and understanding communicative cues (Baron-
Cohen 1989; Baron-Cohen et al. 2000; Happe´ 1993) and
could hinder gaze following in this condition by consuming
attentional or cognitive resources. However, since the
effect in the overall sample is only a trend, further research
will be necessary to draw stronger conclusions.
Using and understanding communicative gaze signals
plays an important role in successful social interactions, e.g.
by helping the coordination of actions in space and time (Clark
and Krych 2004; Richardson and Dale 2005; Schilbach et al.
2011, Autism) or by facilitating social learning (Csibra 2010;
Wang et al. 2010; Yoon et al. 2008). Furthermore, engaging in
attentional relations with others contributes to the under-
standing of others as independent mindful agents and may
help to perceive and interpret attentional relations that are
observed between others (Barresi and Moore 1996; Reddy
2003). We found that individuals with autism responded to
observed attentional relations differently than healthy con-
trols. While control subjects benefitted from congruent gaze
cues particularly after observing eye contact, participants with
HFA did not show an enhanced tendency to follow gaze after
observing eye contact. These differences in processing
observed attentional interactions may be related to differences
between people with and without HFA in using and
responding to social attention themselves. Taken together, the
present findings are the first to show that in contrast to controls,
high-functioning individuals with autism do not process
observed eye contact as a social signal for the relevance of an
upcoming (gaze) event. This difference in attentional pro-
cessing might be related to many of the more apparent char-
acteristics of social communicative behaviour in autism.
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